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1 
BANK OF MARKAZI V. PETERSON: THE EROSION OF 
SEPARATION OF POWERS  
INTRODUCTION 
The separation of powers doctrine results from the three-branch sys-
tem created by the Constitution.1 The Constitution bestows upon each 
branch its own sphere of power and creates a system of “checks and bal-
ances” between branches.2 This doctrine is also derived from historical 
analysis and the intent of the Framers; the colonies experiences with leg-
islatures performing what is now traditionally recognized as judicial 
roles “figur[ed] prominently in the Framer’s decision to devise a system 
[which] secur[es] liberty through the division of power.”3 Furthermore, 
in Marbury v. Madison,4 Justice Marshall declared Article III of the Con-
stitution establishes an independent judiciary whose “province and duty 
is . . . to say what the law is.”5  
This article focuses on the much–adjudicated relationship between 
Congress and the Judiciary.6 Throughout the history of the United States, 
the Court has attempted to articulate the division of power between the 
Legislature and the courts.7  
In United States v. Klein,8 the foundational decision regarding the 
boundary between Congress and the courts in pending litigation, the 
Court stated that the Legislature violated the principles of separation of 
power when Congress “prescribe[ed] rules of decision to the Judicial 
  
 1. See Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 139 S. Ct. 1310, 1330 (2016) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); 
see also Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 219 (1995). 
 2. Amy D. Ronner, Judicial Self-Demise: The Test of When Congress Impermissibly In-
trudes on Judicial Power After Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society and the Federal Appellate 
Courts' Rejection of the Separation of Powers Challenges to The New Section of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 1037, 1038 (1993) (discussing the historical foundation of 
separation of powers).  
 3. Bank Markazi, 139 S. Ct. at 1331 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 4. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 5. Id. at 177. 
 6. This topic is divisive regarding issues outside the scope of this article, such as separation 
of powers in prison litigation reform. For additional information see Linda D. Jellum, "Which Is to 
Be Master," the Judiciary or the Legislature? When Statutory Directives Violate Separation of 
Powers, 56 UCLA L. REV. 837 (2009); Theodore K. Cheng, Invading an Article III Court's Inherent 
Equitable Powers: Separation of Powers and the Immediate Termination Provisions of the Prison 
Litigation Reform Act, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 969 (1999); Ira Bloom, Prisons, Prisoners, and 
Pine Forests: Congress Breaches the Wall Separating Legislative from Judicial Power, 40 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 389 (1998); Heidi J. Goldstein, When the Supreme Court Shuts Its Doors, May Congress Re-
Open Them?: Separation of Powers Challenges to § 27a of the Securities Exchange Act, 34 B.C. L. 
REV. 853 (1993). 
 7. See Howard M. Wasserman, The Irrepressible Myth of Klein, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 53, 54 
(2010). 
 8. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871). 
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Department of the government . . . . in [pending] cases.”9 However, Klein 
has troubled both the courts and legal theorists alike. Justice Ginsberg 
remarked, “Klein has been called a deeply puzzling decision.”10 In Rob-
ertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc.,11 the Court appeared to dilute the holding 
in Klein, which limits the ability of Congress to “force the judiciary’s 
hand.”12 In Plaut v. Spendthrift Farms Inc.,13 the Court reiterated separa-
tion of powers principles and declared Congress cannot command courts 
to reopen settled cases.14 While Plaut does not deal with laws deciding 
pending cases, the case expounds upon the meaning of separation of 
powers and illuminates the dangers of weakening the barrier between 
Congress and the courts.15 
The Court’s most recent decision on the division of power between 
Congress and the judiciary is Bank Markazi v. Peterson.16 In that case, 
Congress had passed legislation that expressly targeted pending litigation 
and allowed citizens to sue a foreign bank otherwise protected under 
sovereign immunity.17 While the Court upheld the law as constitutional, 
this article argues the Court was incorrect in its decision. First, this arti-
cle will present background information on Klein and the formative cases 
interpreting the Klein decision. Next, this article will summarize the ma-
jority opinion and dissenting opinion in Bank Markazi. Finally, this arti-
cle will argue that, in conjunction with Robertson, Bank Markazi further 
dilutes the separation of power between the Legislature and the Judici-
ary, and this weakening of the division of power has dangerous conse-
quences. 
I. BACKGROUND 
This section discusses the history of the Court’s interpretation of the 
separation of power between the Legislature and the Judiciary leading up 
to its decision in Bank Markazi. The Court first articulated the division of 
power between the Judiciary and the Legislature in Klein. The Court then 
diluted the Klein holding in, and then revisited the separation of powers 
doctrine in Plaut.  
The formative decision articulating the separation of power between 
Congress and the courts is Klein.18 Klein is a Reconstruction Era case 
  
 9. Id. at 146. 
 10. Bank Markazi, 139 S. Ct. at 1332 (quoting Daniel J. Meltzer, Congress, Courts, and 
Constitutional Remedies, 86   GEO. L.J. 2537, 2538 (1998).  
 11. 503 U.S. 429 (1992). 
 12. Lawrence G. Sager, Klein’s First Principle: A Proposed Solution, 86 GEO. L.J. 2525, 
2525 (1998). 
 13. 514 U.S. 211 (1995). 
 14. Id. at 219. 
 15. See generally Bank Markazi, 139 S. Ct. at 1330 ((Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (explaining the 
separation of powers). 
 16. Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310 (2016). 
 17. Id. at 1317-18. 
 18. See Ronner, supra note 2, at 1041.  
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involving Civil War legislation that allowed a person whose property had 
been seized and sold during the war to recover the proceeds of the sale 
upon proof he did not aid the rebellion.19 In 1863, President Lincoln is-
sued a presidential pardon that pardoned all rebels who swore an oath of 
loyalty, and the Court in United States v. Pedelford20 held that a presi-
dential pardon established proof the recipient of the pardon did not aid in 
the rebellion.21 Klein, the administrator of an estate whose property had 
been seized and sold, was able to collect.22 However, Congress wished to 
block these claims for political reasons.23 While Klein’s case was pend-
ing, Congress passed an additional piece of legislation stating acceptance 
of pardon without disclaiming participation was proof of disloyalty, and 
thus blocked Klein’s claims.24 The Court declared Congress had “in-
fringed on judicial power because [the new law] attempted to direct the 
result without altering the legal standards governing the effect of a par-
don and attempt[ed] to decide the case by prescribe[ing] the rules of de-
cision to the Judicial Department of the government in cases pending 
before it.”25  
Since Klein, the most significant case approaching this separation of 
power boundary is Robertson.26 Robertson involved appropriations for 
the Department of Interior, where Congress passed new requirements for 
the U.S. Forrest Service’s management of certain forests to protect a 
species of owl.27 When the Seattle Audubon Society sued and challenged 
the Department of Interior’s decision, Congress passed legislation during 
pending litigation which was intended as a political compromise between 
the two groups.28 Problematic with the legislation, however, was that the 
statute explicitly mentioned the case name of the pending litigation and 
stated preexisting conduct satisfied the law.29 
Although it appeared that the statute violated the separation of pow-
ers principles articulated in Klein, the Court held that the statute was 
constitutional.30 The subsections of the statute “compelled changes in the 
law, not findings or results under old law,”31 and therefore Congress did 
  
 19. Bank Markazi, 139 S. Ct. at 1323 (citing United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 
139 (1871)).  
 20. 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 531, 542 (1869). 
 21. Bank Markazi, 139 S. Ct. at 1323 (citing Klein, 80 U.S. at 132).  
 22. Id. at 1324. 
 23. See Id. at 1334 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).  
 24. Id. at 1324. 
 25. Id. at 1334 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Klein, 80 U.S. at 145–46). 
 26. Wasserman, supra note 7, at 67. 
 27. William D. Araiza, The Trouble with Robertson: Equal Protection, the Separation of 
Powers, and the Line Between Statutory Amendment and Statutory Interpretation, 48 CATH. U. L. 
REV. 1055, 1057 (1999).  
 28. Id. at 1058. 
 29. Id.; See also Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc., 503 U.S. 429, 434–35 (1992). 
 30. Robertson, 503 U.S. at 437 (upholding the constitutionality of the statute in question). 
 31. Id. at 438. 
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not infringe upon the Judiciary’s role of deciding cases.32 Additionally, 
the Court was untroubled by the specifics in the law and stated that nam-
ing the pending cases was shorthand for the purpose of clarifying the 
previous regulations that the statute sought to amend.33  
However, in Plaut, the Court held that Congress “exceeded its au-
thority by requiring the federal courts to exercise ‘[t]he judicial power of 
the United States’”34 by passing a statute prolonging the Statute of Limi-
tations for cases already decided. Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia 
relied on the decisions in both Klein and Robertson and determined, even 
though Congress’s statute did amend the law, it is unconstitutional for 
Congress to retroactively command the courts to reopen final judg-
ments.35 Justice Scalia further articulated the history of separation of 
powers, the importance of the doctrine, and stated that permitting Con-
gress to decide cases for the Judiciary is “repugnant” to the Constitu-
tion.36 While the holding in Plaut does not strictly apply to the facts of 
Bank Markazi, Justice Roberts’ dissent in Bank Markazi relied heavily 
on the principles set for in Plaut.37  
II. BANK MARKAZI V. PETERSON 
A. Facts 
The respondents were victims of Iranian–sponsored terrorism who 
sued Iran in 2003 in the District Court for the District of Columbia for 
injuries to themselves and to their family members.38 Many of the inju-
ries were in connection to the 1983 terrorist bombing of a U.S. Marine 
barracks in Lebanon sponsored by Iran.39 In 2003, respondents were 
granted summary judgment by default against the Islamic Republic of 
Iran and obtained billions of dollars of judgments against Iran, much of 
which went unpaid.40 In order to enforce their judgments, respondents 
filed writs of execution in the United States District Court for the South-
ern District of New York for a turnover of $1.75 billion in assets from a 
New York bank owned by Bank of Markazi—the central bank of Iran.41 
Bank Markazi invoked sovereign immunity under the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA).42 During the judgment–enforcement 
  
 32. Id. at 441 (stating generally no Article III jurisprudence was violated).  
 33. Araiza, supra note 27, at 1070; See also Robertson, 503 U.S. at 439–40. 
 34. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218 (1995) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, § 
1). 
 35. Id. at 219.  
 36. Id. at 218.  
 37. See Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 139 S. Ct. 1310, 1330 (2016) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 38. Id. at 1319; See, e.g., Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 264 F.Supp.2d 46, 49 (2003). 
 39. Bank Markazi, 139 S. Ct. at 1319. 
 40. Id. at 1320.  
 41. Id.  
 42. Id. at 1318-19; See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1605.  
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proceedings, Congress passed 22 U.S.C. § 8772 (§ 8772), allowing re-
spondents to execute funds from Bank Markazi.43  
B. Procedural History  
In accordance with § 8772, the District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York ordered Bank Markazi to turn over its assets.44 Bank of 
Markazi appealed, stating § 8772 violated the separation of powers doc-
trine by dictating factual findings and determining the decision of the 
court.45 On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed, and held § 8772 is con-
stitutional because the statute retroactively changed a law.46 
C. Opinion of the Court 
Justice Ginsberg delivered the opinion of the Court.47 Justices Ken-
nedy, Breyer, Alito, and Kagan joined her in all parts, and Justice Thom-
as joined in Part II-C.48 The Court began by stating the issue on appeal: 
“Does § 8772 violate the separation of powers by purporting to change 
the law for, and directing a particular result in, a single pending case?”49 
The Court affirmed the Second Circuits ruling that § 8772 does not vio-
late the separation of powers and stated that Congress can amend the law 
and make changes to pending cases “even when the amendment is out-
come determinative.”50  
The Court next reviewed statutes relevant to the case.51 First, the 
Court reviewed the FSIA, which contained a “terrorist exception” grant-
ing American citizens the right to sue state sponsors of terrorism in U.S. 
courts.52 The Court noted, however, FSIA protected execution of proper-
ty of a “foreign central bank” and thus many successful plaintiffs faced 
difficulties collecting judgments.53 The Court then explained that to 
overcome these difficulties President Obama issued an executive order 
allowing citizens to execute property from any Iranian financial institu-
tion in the United States.54  
When this executive order was challenged, Congress passed 22 
U.S.C. § 8772, which stated if a court makes specified findings, “a finan-
cial asset . . . shall be subject to execution . . . in order to satisfy any 
judgment to the extent of any compensatory damages awarded against 
  
 43. Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, 22 U.S.C. § 8772 (2012). 
 44. Bank Markazi, 139 S. Ct. at 1321. 
 45. Id. at 1322. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 1316. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 1317.  
 50. Id.  
 51. Id.  
 52. Id. (citing to 28 U.S.C. §1606(a)(1)).  
 53. Id. at 1318 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1611(b)(1)).  
 54. Id. 
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Iran for damages for personal injury [by acts of terrorism enumerated in 
FSIA].”55 Furthermore, the statute defines “financial assets” as “the fi-
nancial assets that are identified in and the subject of proceedings in the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York in 
Peterson et al. v. Islamic Republic of Iran et al., Case No. 10 Civ. 4518 
(BSJ) (GWG).”56 Finally, the Court noted that in order for a court to or-
der execution of an asset under § 8772, a court must determine the asset 
is:  
(A) held in the United States for a foreign securities intermediary do-
ing business in the United States; 
(B) a blocked asset . . . and 
(C) equal in value to a financial asset of Iran, including an asset of 
the central bank . . . of the Government of Iran . . . .57 
The Court acknowledged § 8772 is “unusual” because it designates 
assets, deems assets available, and further specifies this statute identifies 
a case named by the docket number.58  
After addressing the relevant statutes and the language of § 8772, 
the Court discussed the jurisprudential history of the separation of pow-
ers doctrine to determine § 8772 does not violate separation of powers. 
The Court began by citing Marbury v. Madison, stating Article III of the 
Constitution establishes an independent Judiciary with the power of judi-
cial review.59 The Court also cited the holdings in Plaut: Congress can-
not require the federal courts to act in a manner repugnant to the Consti-
tution and that Congress may not “retroactively comman[d] the federal 
courts to reopen final judgments.”60  
The Court next addressed Bank of Markazi’s primary argument.61 
Bank of Markazi argued based on the ruling in Klein, Congress violated 
separation of powers and stepped onto judicial turf when § 8772 “pre-
scribe[d] rules of decisions to the Judicial department . . . in pending 
cases.”62 The Court analyzed Klein regarding Bank’s Markazi’s claim 
first by reviewing the facts of Klein, and concluded that the Congress in 
Klein violated the separation of powers because Congress “attempted to 
direct the result altering the legal standards governing the effect of the 
pardon .”63 The Court additionally specified that “[m]ore recent decisions 
  
 55. Id. at 1318-19 (quoting 22 U.S.C. § 8772 (a)). 
 56. Id. at 1319 (quoting 22 U.S.C. § 8772 (b)).  
 57. Id. at 1319 (citing 22 U.S.C. § 8772 (a)(1)).   
 58. Id. at 1317. 
 59. Id. at 1322 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).  
 60. Id. at 1322-23 (quoting Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218-19 (1995)).  
 61. Id. at 1323. 
 62. Id. (quoting United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146 (1871)). 
 63. Id. at 1324. 
2017] EROSION OF SEPARATION OF POWERS 7 
[such as Robertson], however, have made it clear that Klein does not 
inhibit Congress from amending the applicable law.”64 
Furthermore, the Court determined that the language of Klein can-
not be taken at “face value” because Congress often has the power to 
make retroactive statutes, and constitutional restrictions regarding retro-
active legislation are of “limited scope.”65 The Court listed the sections 
of the Constitution that expressly inhibit retroactive legislation.66 The 
Court qualified, absent one of these specific violations, “Congress may 
indeed direct courts to apply newly enacted, outcome–altering legislation 
in pending civil cases.”67   
Moreover, a statute does not impose upon judicial autonomy when 
it changes the substantive law.68 While Bank Markazi argued § 8772 
“effectively” directed fact finding, the Court contended that § 8772 pro-
vided a new standard that if Iran holds assets, victims of terrorism can 
execute those assets.69 Section 8772 amended the substantive law and is 
therefore constitutional.70 The Court additionally responded to the dis-
sent’s arguments and stated a law that says “Smith wins” is of course 
unconstitutional, but for reasons other than the separation of powers 
principles.71 The Court maintained this type of hypothetical law is irra-
tional and would not amend substantive law, unlike § 8772.72  
The Court rejected Bank Markazi’s additional argument that be-
cause § 8772 is not general, the statute is suspect.73 The Court cited to 
several cases where statutes that govern a small number of cases were 
valid and affirmed that lack of generality of a statute does not imply the 
statute is unconstitutional.74  
Finally, in Section II-C the Court concluded § 8772 is a “congres-
sional exercise regarding foreign affairs” and stressed its deference to 
Congress and the Executive in that domain.75 The Court reflected that 
throughout history Congress and the President have regulated foreign 
assets to further foreign policy objectives, and “[s]uch measures have 
never been rejected as an invasion upon the Article III judicial power.”76 
The Court further remarked that when Congress altered the law regarding 
property belonging to Iran in the United States, “Congress acted com-
  
 64. Id. at 1323 (quoting Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc., 503 U.S. 429, 441 (1992). 
 65. Id. at 1324. 
 66. Id.  
 67. Id. at 1325.  
 68. See Id. at 1326.  
 69. Id. at 1325. 
 70. Id. at 1326. 
 71. Id.  
 72. Id.  
 73. Id. at 1327. 
 74. Id. at 1328. 
 75. Id.   
 76. Id.  
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fortably within the political branches’ authority over foreign sovereign 
immunity and foreign-state assets.”77 The Court concluded by affirming 
the lower court’s decision holding § 8772 does not infringe upon separa-
tion of powers principles.78 
D. Dissenting Opinion  
Chief Justice Roberts delivered the dissenting opinion, joined by 
Justice Sotomayor.79 The dissent stated it would hold § 8772 violates the 
separation of powers because Congress enacted legislation that directed 
the court’s ruling.80 Section 8772 was “tailored to this case . . . [and] 
resolves the parties’ specific legal disputes to guarantee respondent’s 
victory” and is therefore unconstitutional.81  
The dissent began with a story asking the reader to imagine that his 
neighbor sues him over a property line dispute.82 The neighbor presents a 
letter from the previous homeowner accepting the neighbor’s version of 
facts as evidence, and the reader presents a defense of an old county 
map.83 The dissent then asked the reader to imagine that while the suit is 
pending, the neighbor persuades the Legislature to pass a law stating that 
for the “readers case alone” a letter is conclusive evidence and the neigh-
bor wins.84 The dissent then questioned the reader about who decided the 
case: “the Legislature which targeted your specific case . . . so as to en-
sure your neighbor’s victory, or the court?”85 The dissent likened § 8772 
to this scenario, illustrating the violation of separation of powers.86 
The dissent next discussed the foundation of separation of powers.87 
The dissent stated separation of powers is foundational to the United 
States and “safeguards individual freedom.”88 Citing Justice Scalia’s 
historical analysis in Plaut, the dissent remarked the foundation of the 
separation of powers was the Framers experience with colonial legisla-
tures performing typically judicial roles.89 The Framer’s experience was 
fundamental to their decision to devise “a system of securing liberty” 
through a tripartite system of government comprised of checks and bal-
  
 77. Id. at 1329 
 78. Id.  
 79. Id.  (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).  
 80. Id. at 1330.   
 81. Id.   
 82. Id. at 1329.  
 83. Id.    
 84. Id.   
 85. Id.   
 86. See Id.  
 87. Id. at 1330. 
 88. Id.  
 89. Id. at 1331.  
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ances.90 The dissent expressed the importance that “judicial power 
[is] . . . the judiciary’s alone.”91  
The dissent then reviewed the language of § 8772 and determined 
Congress’s statute unconstitutionally “assumes the role of a judge” and 
determines the outcome of the case.92 The dissent stated “there has never 
been anything like § 8772 before” and deemed the outcome-
determinative nature and the specifics of the statute concerning.93 Not 
only does § 8772 cite pending litigation, but § 8772 also states that the 
statute shall not affect “a judgment in any other action against a terrorist 
party in any other proceeding.”94 The dissent distinguished § 8772 from 
the majority’s analysis of Robertson, stating the statute in Robertson is 
not comparable to this case because the specificity in that situation was 
intended merely as shorthand for an otherwise valid exercise of Congres-
sional power.95 
Based on the principles set forth in Klein, the dissent deemed 
§ 8772 violates separation of powers.96 The dissent criticized the majori-
ty’s view of Klein and specified, although Klein may not have set forth 
clear rules defining the division of power between Congress and the 
courts, “it does not mean—as the majority seems to think—that Arti-
cle III itself imposes no such limits.”97 The dissent also commented on 
the majority’s characterization of the meaning of a change in substantive 
law and asserted that almost any law passed by Congress changes the 
law.98 This is because “changing the law is simply how Congress acts.”99 
Furthermore, the dissent stressed the importance of a true division of 
power between Congress and the Judiciary and criticized the majority for 
not recognizing a separation of power between the two branches, short of 
a statute stating “Smith Wins.” 100  
Finally, the dissent remarked on the majority’s deference to Con-
gress in the sphere of foreign policy.101 The dissent emphasized that 
Congress has “extensive powers of [its] own” in the arena of foreign 
affairs and could have resolved the issue differently.102 Rather, through 
  
 90. Id. at 1332; See also Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 221 (1995).  
 91. Bank Markazi, 139 S. Ct. at 1332 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (remarking the language of 
Article III establishes an independent judiciary). 
 92. Id.   
 93. Id. at 1333. 
 94. Id. (quoting 22 U.S.C. § 8772(c) (2012)).  
 95. Id. at 1336 (citing Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc., 503 U.S. 429, 433-35 (1992).   
 96. Id. at 1334. See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 147 (1871).  
 97. Bank Markazi, 139 S. Ct. at 1335 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).  
 98. Id.  
 99. Id. 
 100. Id.  
 101. See Id. at 1336. 
 102. Id. at 1337  
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§ 8772, Congress “seized” the authority of the Court and “comman-
deered the courts to make a political judgment.”103 
III. ANALYSIS 
The Court incorrectly decided Bank Markazi. In its decision, the 
Court abrogated separation of powers principles for pending litigation 
that were established in Klein. This decision is dangerous because it 
threatens the individual liberty that the Framers sought to protect through 
division of power. Additionally, Bank Markazi perilously strengthens 
Congress and weakens the Judiciary by allowing Congress to decide cas-
es rather than an independent Judiciary.  
A. Bank Markazi Extends Beyond Robertson and Abates Klein. 
Bank Markazi abrogates Klein. As stated previously, Klein is the 
seminal and foundational case regarding the separation of power between 
Congress and the Judiciary in pending litigation.104 While Klein states an 
important separation of powers principle, that Congress may not decide 
cases for the courts, legal scholars have noted the confusion surrounding 
Klein and the Court’s wariness to apply its principles.105 After the 
Court’s decision in Bank Markazi, the Court appears to have abrogated 
Klein and eroded the division of power between Congress and the Judici-
ary in pending cases.106 
The Court refers to Klein as a “puzzling” decision.107 While the de-
cision in Klein is unclear, many legal scholars have assessed Klein to 
mean: (1) Congress can prescribe rules of decisions in pending litigation 
only by amending the substantive law and (2) Congress cannot tell courts 
how to decide an issue of fact or determine an evidentiary matter.108 
Some have even referenced Klein as a myth.109 Regardless of the exact 
meaning of Klein, most importantly the Court has not deemed any act of 
Congress created during pending legislation to be unconstitutional under 
the principles set forth in Klein, leaving the boundary between Congress 
  
 103. Id.   
 104. Ronner, supra note 2, at 1039.   
 105. Sager, supra note 12. 
 106. Ronner, supra note 2, at 1048.  
 107. Bank Markazi, 139 S. Ct. at 1323.  
 108. Id. at 1046; Wasserman, supra note 7, at 54–9; Araiza, supra note 27, at 1074; Sager, 
supra note 12, at 2529. 
 109. Wasserman, supra note 7, at 53; Araiza, supra note 27, at 1074; Barry Friedman, 
The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part II: Reconstruction's Political Court, 91 Geo. 
L.J. 1, 34 (2002) (“Klein is sufficiently impenetrable that calling it opaque is a compliment”); Daniel 
J. Meltzer, Congress, Courts, and Constitutional Remedies, 86 Geo. L.J. 2537, 2549 (1998) (“Much 
that it said in the opinion is exaggerated if not dead wrong....”); Sager, supra note 12, at 2525 (argu-
ing that, while not exactly Fermat's Last Theorem, Klein is “deeply puzzling”); Gordon G. Young, 
Congressional Regulations of Federal Courts' Jurisdiction and Processes: United States v. Klein 
Revisited, 1981 WIS. L. REV. 1189, 1193, 1195 (describing opinion as “confusing” and criticizing 
“excessively broad and ambiguous statements” in majority opinion). 
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and the courts unclear.110 However, first in its decision in Robertson111 
and then in its decision in Bank Markazi, the Court dilutes any such prin-
ciples set forth in Klein. Both cases involve statutes that appear to be 
clear examples of what Klein forbids, yet both are upheld. 
The statute in Robertson seemed “to be a clear example of what 
[Klein] decries,”112 and many infer Robertson to implicitly overrule 
Klein.113 By allowing Congress to specifically tailor legislation to a few 
pending cases, Robertson allowed Congress to direct the decision of the 
case.114 Although the Court distinguished Robertson from Klein in that 
the statute in Robertson amended the law, Robertson essentially declares 
separation of powers cannot be violated so long as Congress can be said 
to have amended the law.115 Thus, “the distillation of Robertson is the 
inane proposition that as long as legislation is legislation, then it is 
properly legislation.”116  
Should the state of Klein be unclear after Robertson, the decision in 
Bank Markazi extends beyond Robertson to disregard the separation of 
powers principles stated in Klein. The Court not only affirmed Robertson 
by stating that the separation of powers is not offended so long as Con-
gress amends the law,117 but surpassed Robertson by allowing Congress 
to target a single pending case with legislation that expressly states the 
statute solely applies to the pending case and nothing else.118 Whereas 
Robertson applied to a small group of cases and stated case names as 
shorthand for regulations, the Court took one step further and upheld the 
constitutionality of a statute so specifically targeted at pending legisla-
tion.119 The ability of Congress to target a single case weakens the divi-
sion of power between Congress and the Judiciary because Congress is 
deciding the case rather than the courts.120  
The Court defended its decision and stated that Congress exercised 
constitutional power because § 8772 amends the law and still allows the 
court to determine fact.121 Undoubtedly, through legislation, Congress 
prescribes rules of decision when the law establishes conduct for courts 
to determine and imposes legal liability.122 However, there is a difference 
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between Congress “hoping” for an outcome in a case based on the law 
and deciding a case by targeting that pending case through legislation.123   
The Court’s argument that § 8772 changes the substantive law and 
leaves courts the ability to determine facts is suspect. Congress did not 
write legislation hoping for an outcome. Instead, § 8772 tells the Court 
how to decide based on facts that are already determined.124 While 
§ 8772 technically allows a Court to determine if an asset is “(a) held in 
the United States for foreign securities . . . (b) a blocked asset . . . and (c) 
equal in value to a financial asset of Iran, including an asset of the central 
bank . . . of the Government of Iran,”125 these facts which implicate Bank 
Markazi were already “well established” at the time the statute was writ-
ten.126 When facts of a case are already decided and implicated in the 
statute, the courts cannot determine facts in any meaningful way.127 
Therefore, when the Court determines a statute that applies solely to 
pending litigation and already has the facts, the principles set forth in 
Klein are implicitly overruled. While pieces of Klein, such as the holding 
that Congress cannot change evidentiary procedures or write a law stat-
ing “Smith Wins,”128 the meaningful boundary of power between Con-
gress and the courts is dissolved. The Court weakened the separation of 
powers in Robertson,129 and now upholds a statute deciding a pending 
case.130 Therefore, Bank of Markazi makes the meaning of Klein clear: 
Klein is a relic of the past.  
B. The Dilution of Separation of Powers Threatens Individual Liberty.   
Bank Markazi is a dangerous precedent because the decision reduc-
es the separation of power between Congress and the courts, and in turn 
this endangers individual liberty. The Constitution creates an independ-
ent Judiciary with the power to decide cases.131 Bank Markazi blurs that 
division of power. 
Separation of powers protects individual liberty.132 This doctrine is 
instilled in the American conscious and is an extension of the Framers’ 
beliefs.133 Congress is traditionally viewed as “the most dangerous 
branch” and the judiciary is viewed as the protector of individual 
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rights.134 As a guardian of individual liberty, the partition between legis-
lative and judicial power is critical.135 
When Congress can single out a case, having already determined 
the facts, Congress dictates to the Judiciary how to rule.136 In this situa-
tion, Congress has no check on its power, and the political check is likely 
unavailable.137 The likelihood is small that a small group whose case has 
been decided by legislation will have an immensely difficult time garner-
ing the necessary political power and support to vote-out members of 
Congress. Additionally, when a law has a narrow range, legislation may 
not receive full consideration by congressmen before there is a vote.138 
Thus, when Congress dictates decisions to the courts, as was done in 
Bank Markazi, it is repugnant to the separation of powers and is a threat 
to individual freedom and liberty.  
Moreover, the Court did not present a meaningful line to separate 
power to ensure an independent judiciary. As the dissent stated, a law as 
blatant as “Smith Wins” is contrary to the separation of powers.139 How-
ever, even this arbitrary line holds little weight because the Court accept-
ed § 8772, tailored in the same way as “Smith Wins,” as constitutional.140 
Where is the line dividing power and maintaining an independent Judici-
ary? Again, while the Court argued changes in the substantive law do not 
violate separation of powers,141 this is a tautological argument. Almost 
any law created by Congress (maybe short of the statute passed in Klein) 
can be seen as a substantive change in the law.142 Not only did the Court 
abate Klein, but the Court failed to distinguish any true separation of 
power to stop Congress from expanding its power and infringing upon 
the Judiciary. This failure fundamentally violates the separation of pow-
ers and is a threat to individual liberty by permitting the “most dangerous 
branch”143 to impede upon an independent Judiciary.  
Although the Court criticized the argument that non-general statutes 
are suspect,144 Congress’s “singling out” pending litigation for particular 
individuals is an encroachment of individual liberty.145 In his concurring 
opinion in Plaut, Justice Breyer noted an additional reason Congress’s 
law violated separation of powers is that specificity of legislation to a 
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small, closed group singles out individuals.146 The phenomenon of sin-
gling out is when Congress singles out individuals and applies the law to 
them on a case by case basis.147 Justice Breyer contended that legislation 
in most circumstances has general applicability, and laws that single out 
small groups or individuals “lack the liberty-protecting assurances” that 
laws with general applicability maintain.148 Thus, statutes that specifical-
ly single out small groups or individuals contradict the separation of 
powers principles.149  
Section 8772 does what Justice Breyer deemed to violate the sepa-
ration of powers. Not only does § 8772 single out a pending case by 
name, but the statute expressly states § 8772 is not to be applied to any 
other proceedings other than the named pending case.150 Justice Breyer 
viewed the statute in Plaut, which applied to a small, but not closed 
group, to violate separation of powers.151 Using this same line of reason-
ing, § 8772 certainly singles out Bank Markazi. 
C. Bank Markazi Expands Congress’s Power and Weakens the Courts’ 
Power.   
Furthermore, Bank Markazi expands the power and purview of 
Congress, and in turn, limits the power of the Court. In its decision, the 
Court deferred to Congress and the President in the sphere of foreign 
policy.152 The dissent pointed out the consequences for Bank Markazi go 
beyond simply removing sovereign immunity from the bank and strip-
ping bank of any protection from federal law, state law, or international 
law.153 In addition to the consequences to the bank, Bank Markazi ex-
pands Congress’s power in the realm of foreign policy, granting Con-
gress deference to decide a pending case simply because “foreign affairs 
[is] a domain in which the controlling role of the political branches is 
both necessary and proper.”154 The Court’s deference to Congress and 
the President in all things foreign policy is a dangerous precedent. While 
Bank Markazi is a foreign bank, what is to stop Congress from deciding 
an American citizen’s pending suit in the name of foreign policy?  
The opportunities for abuse of power, the very abuse the Framers 
sought to curtail via the separation of powers, are worrisome. Even 
though Congress has enumerated foreign policy powers in the Constitu-
tion, the Court is supposed to operate as a check to Congress’s power.155 
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By simply deferring to Congress and allowing Congress to “unabashedly 
pick winners and losers in particular pending cases,” the Court decreases 
its power of judicial review and increases the power of Congress in for-
eign policy.156  
IV. CONCLUSION  
In Bank Markazi, the Court eroded the division of power between 
Congress and the Judiciary. Through this decision, the Court abates any 
such separation of powers principles for pending legislation set forth in 
Klein, by permitting Congress to decide pending cases. This dilution of 
separations of powers has dangerous consequences beyond Bank Marka-
zi. Without a meaningful division of power supporting an independent 
judiciary, Congress is free to trample on individual liberties that separa-
tion of powers seeks to protect. Furthermore, the deterioration of separa-
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